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FASHION FORWARD: THE NEED FOR A
PROACTIVE APPROACH TO THE
COUNTERFEIT EPIDEMIC
INTRODUCTION
While walking down Canal Street in Manhattan a man
whispers: “I have Chanel, Chloé, Gucci, Louis Vuitton.”1 A
few strides later, another cautious man hands over a pamphlet
containing rows upon rows of luxury designer handbags,2 in-
cluding a $90 Louis Vuitton handbag that would retail for $710
at the Louis Vuitton store on Fifth Avenue, a few subway stops
away. It does not take a savvy shopper to recognize that what
he is offering is not simply the deal of a lifetime, but instead a
counterfeit good—an illegal imitation of a trademarked prod-
uct.3
Trademarks have identified goods for thousands of years.4
Consequently, the advent of trademarks spawned the oppor-
tunity for the counterfeit market.5 Dating back to the Greco-
Roman era, a nexus between luxury goods and social status ex-
isted, and those who could not afford such goods sought cheap-
er imitations in the hopes of achieving a similar purpose.6 As
1. Leah Goldman & Julie Zevloff, An Undercover Look at the Billion-
Dollar Fake Goods Market Of Chinatown, BUS. INSIDER (May 7, 2011),
http://www.businessinsider.com/fake-purse-shopping-china-town-2011-
5?op=1.
2. Michael Wilson, Fake Guccis, and a Real Cat-And-Mouse Game, N.Y.
TIMES, July 16, 2011, at A15.
3. A likely assumption, although not confirmed.
4. “Some form” of trademark has been utilized since ancient times. PEGGY
E. CHAUDHRY& ALAN ZIMMERMAN, PROTECTING YOUR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS: UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT,
CONSUMERS AND PIRATES 8 (2013). For example, four to five thousand years
ago, “marked pottery appeared in China,” and in Greco-Roman times, “Greek
vases identified both the maker and also the wholesaler of the item.” Id.
5. Id. at 7. Counterfeiting has been affecting trade for at least two thou-
sand years. Id. For example, Pliny the elder described Romans as favoring
counterfeit coins. As such, “[g]oldsmiths, soldiers, bankers, convicts on gal-
leys, and even priests were involved in developing counterfeit coinage.” Id.
6. See Katherine B. Felice, Fashioning A Solution for Design Piracy: Con-
sidering Intellectual Property Law in the Global Context of Fast Fashion, 39
SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 219, 220 (2011). Pliny the Elder warned consum-
ers of wearing opals made of glass. See CHAUDHRY & ZIMMERMAN, supra note
4, at 8.
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history progressed,7 the nexus between social status and luxury
goods continued, thus promoting the consistently increasing
demand for counterfeit goods.8 Today, it is estimated that the
total value of counterfeit and pirated products is $650 billion
annually.9 This estimate is not solely based on the goods ex-
changed interpersonally on Canal Street and like methods;
rather, this estimate also encompasses digital counterfeit-
ing.10 Today, the threat of the counterfeit market stretches do-
mestically,11 internationally,12 and perhaps most important-
ly—digitally. 13 This threat is particularly problematic be-
cause it not only hurts trademark holders14 and consumers,15
but also imposes costs on the global economy.
In the last two decades, the overall activity of the counterfeit
market has risen 10,000 percent, which is largely due to the
popularity of the Internet.16 With approximately 3.2 billion In-
7. In the seventeenth century, a Spanish priest by the name of Domingo
Navarette lamented “the Chinese are very ingenious at imitation. They have
imitated to perfection whatsoever they have seen brought out of Europe.”
Counterfeiting: Imitating Property is Theft, ECONOMIST (May 15, 2003),
http://www.economist.com/node/1780818.
8. See id.
9. Bus. Action to Stop Counterfeiting & Piracy (BASCAP), Estimating the
Global Economic and Social Impacts of Counterfeiting and Piracy 5 (2011)
[hereinafter BASCAP Social Impact Study],
http://www.iccwbo.org/Data/Documents/Bascap/Global-Impacts-Study—-Full-
Report/.
10. See id. at 8.
11. In 2008, the value of counterfeit and pirated goods produced and con-
sumed domestically was estimated between $140–$215 billion. Id. at 5.
12. In 2008, the value of counterfeit and pirated goods moving across in-
ternational channels alone was estimated between $285–$360 billion. Id.
13. Internet traffic growth has been correlated with the increase in manu-
facture and sale of counterfeit and pirated products. See id. at 8. Further, the
Counterfeit Intelligence Bureau estimated that $25 billion in counterfeit
goods were traded over the Internet in 2003 alone. See Counterfeiting: Imitat-
ing Property is Theft, supra note 7.
14. See discussion of the effect on trademark holders infra Section II.B.
15. See discussion of the effect on consumers infra Section II.B.
16. Tamlin H. Bason, Explosion of Online Counterfeiting Requires Dili-
gence, Awareness of Evolving Schemes, BLOOMBERG BNA (Oct. 12, 2011),
http://www.bna.com/explosion-online-counterfeiting-n12884903849/; see also
Counterfeiting: Imitating Property is Theft, supra note 7 (“[T]he internet has
been a boon to counterfeiters, giving them detailed information about which
goods to copy and allowing them to link consumers and suppliers with ease
and relative anonymity.”).
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ternet users worldwide,17 counterfeiters now can cater to virtu-
ally any willing customer with Internet access.18 Naïve is the
person who believes these knockoff products are contained only
in shady vans and distributed pamphlets on Canal Street. Buy-
ers can now find these illegitimate goods on commonly used
household websites such as eBay and Amazon.19 For example,
on eBay, a consumer can purchase a $375 Gucci wallet for $120
from a vendor in South Korea.20 The digital age has married
the appeal of obtaining cheap and illegitimate luxury goods
with the simplicity of a mouse click.
With the aid of the Internet, the counterfeit market has now
turned global. Such globalization, however, has fostered a vari-
ety of new concerns, including how to determine who is respon-
sible for the distribution of these knockoffs, and who should be
charged to limit them in the marketplace. More specifically,
there is extreme difficulty regarding the prosecution of counter-
feiters.21 Intellectual property rights owners (“IPROs”), such as
owners of trademarks, look to other parties involved in counter-
feit sales when seeking accountability.22 Generally, in U.S. and
EU law, intermediaries such as Google, Amazon, and eBay are
unlikely to be found liable for direct trademark infringement
because they are not the physical seller of the goods.23 Further,
while trademark holders can and do seek accountability in the
17. INTERNET LIVE STATS, http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users/
(last visited Feb. 1, 2016).
18. See Bason, supra note 16; see also Brad Stone, Battle Over Stolen
Goods Sold Online Goes to Washington, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2008),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/22/battle-over-stolen-goods-sold-online-
goes-to-washington/ (quoting Joe LaRocca, Vice President of loss prevention
for the National Retail Federation, who testified that thieves become
“hooked” by the anonymity selling illegal goods online provides, and “the ease
with which they gain exposure to millions of customers”).
19. See Loretta Chao, What Happens When an eBay Steal is a Fake?, WALL
ST. J. (June 29, 2006), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB115154214225593742.
20. Gucci confirmed that this product was a counterfeit—the product did
not match any style produced by Gucci. See id.
21. See Todd Evan Lerner, Playing the Blame Game, Online: Who is Liable
When Counterfeit Goods are Sold Through Online Auction Houses?, 22 PACE
INT’L L. REV. 241, 246 (2010). See generally Org. for Econ. Co-operation &
Dev., The Economic Impact of Counterfeiting and Piracy (2007),
http://www.oecd.org/sti/38707619.pdf.
22. See id.
23. See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 527 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).
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form of secondary liability,24 the threshold is high for a success-
ful case.25 This then leaves the burden on IPROs to address the
costs associated with counterfeit sales as well as the damage to
their trademarks. It has been estimated that in the United
States alone, counterfeit sales cost legitimate businesses
$250 billion a year in lost revenue.26 Additionally, infringe-
ment damages trademarks in the form of customer confusion,
deception, and mistake, as to the origin of the goods or ser-
vices.27
This Note argues that the burden structure currently in place
by U.S. and EU laws to police this activity is insufficient, from
both a cost28 and a pragmatic perspective. In requiring IPROs
to carry the burden of preventing trademark infringement, the
law fails to acknowledge that it would be more reasonable to
shift the responsibility partially to the intermediaries when
both parties are put at risk by counterfeit infringement. In re-
sponse, this Note proposes that the EU and the United States
should take steps to follow the recent U.K. High Court deci-
sion,29 Cartier Int’l AG v. British Sky Broad. Ltd.,30 which al-
24. “Secondary liability” encompasses several types of liability for trade-
mark infringement, including contributory infringement, which will be dis-
cussed further in this Note. Secondary liability does not blame the defendant
for directly infringing on the mark, but rather holds the defendant responsi-
ble for infringement by a third party who is usually under the defendant’s
control. See Graeme Dinwoodie, Secondary Liability for Online Trademark
Infringement: The International Landscape, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 463, 463
(2014).
25. See Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall & Assocs., 135 F. Supp. 2d 409, 420
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) ( “[T]rademark plaintiffs bear a high burden in establishing
‘knowledge’ of contributory infringement.”). “Knowledge” refers to the notion
that “generalized knowledge” is insufficient to prove secondary liability, and
a rights holder therefore must send a notice of every instance of trademark
violations to the intermediary. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 106
(2d Cir. 2010) (internal citations omitted).
26. See Maura Kutner, The Fight Against Fakes Online, HARPER’S BAZAAR
(Dec. 14, 2010, 3:00 PM), http://www.harpersbazaar.com/fashion/fashion-
articles/fight-against-fakes-online-0111.
27. About Trademark Infringement, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/trademark_infringement.jsp (last visited
Oct. 10, 2015).
28. It would be more cost efficient for the intermediaries to monitor such
activity on their own. See Ronald J. Mann & Seth R. Belzley, The Promise of
Intermediary Liability, 47 WM. &MARY L. REV. 239, 264 n.81 (2005).
29. Shifting partial responsibility to intermediaries in the form of second-
ary liability is conducive to society on both economic efficiency grounds as
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lowed the United Kingdom to be the first EU-Member State to
require intermediaries to block trademark-infringing websites.
It concludes, therefore, that the increase in the global counter-
feit market requires a heightened standard of care from inter-
mediaries than currently required by law and practice. Conse-
quently, the United States and other EU-Member States
should follow the Cartier approach.
Part I of this Note will provide a brief outline of the counter-
feit market in the twenty-first century. Additionally, it will ex-
plain what a trademark is and why this form of intellectual
property matters. Part I will then identify the costs—both fi-
nancially and in terms of goodwill—and victims of the counter-
feiting industry. Part I will also discuss the intermediaries and
the role they play in the larger counterfeit epidemic.
Part II will provide an overview of the current law on second-
ary liability for trademark infringement in the United States.
Specifically, this Part will discuss the Trademark Act of 1964
(the “Lanham Act”)31 and examine the U.S. case law currently
governing secondary liability. These cases include Inwood
Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc.,32 Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc.,33
and other successive cases, which analyze contributory and di-
rect infringement. Subsequently, Part III will discuss current
EU law on secondary liability for trademark infringement. Ad-
ditionally, this Part will conduct a comparative analysis be-
tween U.S. and EU law, with particular attention to differences
in procedural aspects. It will also discuss the E-Commerce di-
rective in the context of how it relates to secondary liability for
trademark infringement, and review case law from different
EU-Member States regarding the differing degrees of judicial
doctrine across Member-State lines.
Part IV will argue that despite attempts to quell the problem,
the counterfeit market is still growing exponentially. Current
issues will be discussed to illustrate the point that further
well as on a moral basis. See Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian, The Se-
cret Life of Legal Doctrine: The Divergent Evolution of Secondary Liability in
Trademark and Copyright Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1363, 1366 (2006).
30. Cartier Int’l AG v. British Sky Broad. Ltd. [2014] EWHC (Ch) 3354,
[2014] Ch. 464 (Eng.),
http://www.bailii.org/we/cases/EWHC/Ch/2003/3354.html.
31. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–72, 1091–96, 1111–27, 1141, 1141a–41n (2010).
32. 456 U.S. 844 (1982).
33. 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).
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steps must be taken to address the counterfeit epidemic. Final-
ly, Part V will examine Cartier and conclude that the U.K.
court was just in its landmark decision. It will also propose a
workable solution for moving forward in combatting cyber-
trademark misconduct. Ultimately, Part V will argue that leg-
islation should be passed that requires intermediaries to im-
plement website-blocking technologies to prevent sellers from
using their channels to encourage the counterfeit epidemic. Ra-
ther than placing the burden entirely on IPROs to combat the
counterfeit market, current legislation must be amended or
passed that distributes the burden of policing trademark in-
fringements. This solution would produce a harmonious rela-
tionship between the intermediary and the trademark holders,
as well as enforce improved business practices globally.
I. COUNTERFEITING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
In both the United States and EU, there is an unfortunate
propinquity between trademarks and counterfeit goods. This
interrelationship is destructive for multiple parties, collectively
described as the “stakeholders.” These groups are composed of
IPROs, consumers, governments, and even the intermediaries.
While IPROs have the heaviest burden in divorcing this link-
age, all stakeholders feel injury. This Part will discuss the nex-
us between trademarks and counterfeit goods, and the stake-
holders in the overall counterfeit quandary. This Part aims to
provide an adequate foundation, which will later help illustrate
how the current burden structure is inadequate.
A. The Nexus Between Trademarks and Counterfeit Goods
Legal mechanisms for trademark protection vary globally. In
the United States, trademark law is governed under the Lan-
ham Act.34 A trademark is defined as “any word, name, symbol,
or device” used to distinguish and protect one’s good or service
from another’s in the marketplace.35 Rather than protecting the
design of the good itself,36 trademark law protects market in-
34. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1051 (West 1946). The Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham
Act) regulates the use of trademark activity and imposes civil and criminal
liability for infringement, dilution, and false advertising.
35. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1946).
36. Alternatively, while patents and design patents may protect the design
of a product, patents have proven to be “impracticable” in the fashion indus-
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tegrity by guarding against unfair competition and rewarding
fair and continuous use.37 Internationally, the Madrid System38
is used for registering trademarks. Under the Madrid System,
which employs a singular registration scheme, a trademark
holder may be subject to the protection of the laws under the
eighty-eight member countries.39 In the EU, the Trademark
Regulation administers community trademarks, while Di-
rective 2008/95 harmonizes national trademark law. 40 The
trademark is then registered with the Office for Harmonization
in the Internal Market, and in a single registration, proce-
dure41 protection is given across all EU-Member States.
try due to the time it takes to be issued when compared to the length of a
fashion-season cycle. See Lauren Indvik, Why Patent-Holding Designs Still
Get Knocked Off: A Case Study With Alexander Wang, FASHIONISTA (Dec. 18,
2013), http://fashionista.com/2013/12/why-fashion-designers-get-knocked-off-
alexander-wang. In the United States, copyright protection does not extend to
the fashion industry. Also, copyright protection is not practicable for design-
ers either. Copyright “does not typically extend to designs, such as the style,
cut, shape, or dimensions of an article of clothing.” Steven I. Weisburd et al.,
The Design Privacy Prohibition Act, N.Y. L.J., at 2 (Jan. 20, 2009),
http://www.dicksteinshapiro.com/sites/default/files/Design_Piracy_Prohibitio
n_Act.pdf. Thus, trademarks are the most viable route for a designer looking
to protect their work.
37. See generally About Trademarks, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. (WIPO),
http://www.wipo.int/trademarks/en/about_trademarks.html#function (last
visited Oct. 11, 2015).
38. The Madrid Protocol is a single filing system for trademarks. See The
Madrid Protocol, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/law/madrid/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2015).
Using one application and only one set of fees, the applicant can potentially
receive protection under numerous jurisdictions, providing for both a cost-
effective and efficient method of registration. No local agent of the jurisdic-
tion is needed for approval of the trademark. See id. Once the trademark has
been accepted, however, it is as if the jurisdiction itself has approved it. See
id.
39. Each member country decides whether or not to protect the applicant
under their domestic laws. See Madrid FAQs, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/law/madrid/madridfaqs.jsp#q2 (last visited
Oct. 12, 2015).
40. Council Regulation 207/2009, 2009 O.J. (L 78) 1 (EC).
41. The Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (OHIM) registra-
tion process is a streamlined method of protecting a trademark across the
EU. The registrant is able to apply online, and under a single fee, one can
receive a “community trademark.” See Trade Marks in the European Union,
OFF. FOR HARMONIZATION IN THE INTERNAL MKT.,
https://oami.europa.eu/ohimportal/en/trade-marks-in-the-european-union
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Trademark protection relates to counterfeits by way of unfair
competition.42 The Lanham Act defines a counterfeit item as
“a spurious mark, which is identical with, or substantially
indistinguishable from, a registered [trade]mark.”43 Through
trademark protection, an imitation good that hinders unfair
competition is legally barred from the marketplace. Of course,
its continued illegal presence in the marketplace remains a
current issue. Under U.S. law, a remedy for trademark in-
fringement typically includes an injunction of the specific in-
stance of infringement44 and potentially monetary damages.45
Trademark protection aids consumers in their decision to
purchase a specific product. A trademark serves as an informed
indicator as to the specific origin46 and level of quality of a
good.47 Conversely, consumers who purchase a deceptive, coun-
terfeit good will likely be confused from the misguided belief
(last visited Oct. 12, 2015). The jurisdictions currently covered under the
community trademark system are Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Lux-
embourg, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom. Global Trademark Resources: What is the Commu-
nity Trade Mark?, INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N,
http://www.inta.org/TrademarkBasics/FactSheets/Pages/CommunityTradeMa
rkFactSheet.aspx (last visited Oct. 12, 2015).
42. This is because “fake goods compete unfairly with genuine products.”
Eur. Comm’n Memo, Too Good to be True: the Real Price of Fake Products,
EUR. COMM’N (Apr. 19, 2013) [hereinafter Brussels Memo],
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-346_en.pdf.
43. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1946).
44. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (1946).
45. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1946).
46. See Stacey Dogan & Mark Lemley, Trademark in Transition: Institute
for Intellectual Property & Information Law Symposium: Trademarks and
Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 786–87 (2004).
47. See World Intell. Prop. Org., World Intellectual Property Report:
Brands—Reputation and Image in the Global Marketplace 6 (2013),
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/intproperty/944/wipo_pub_944_2013.pd
f.
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that they have purchased a genuine, trademarked good.48 As a
result, those consumers may lose confidence in the market.49
Trademarks are essential to sellers as well, particularly with
respect to luxury brands.50 For luxury brands like Louis Vuit-
ton and Chanel, given the relative unavailability of patent and
copyright law for the fashion industry, trademark law is the
central protective measure of the overall brand.51 Sellers are
given both the freedom and incentive to invest funds to develop
a product without fear that the product will be imitated and
sold by a competing brand.52 Further, sellers are able to devel-
op goodwill53 and brand image free of the threat of illegal copy-
cats. In short, trademark protection offers sellers and consum-
ers alike obvious benefits. Unfortunately, they also carry the
heaviest burden due to counterfeit costs.
B. The Stakeholders
The distribution of counterfeit goods on the Internet affects
multiple parties: the IPROs, the general public, the govern-
ment, and the intermediaries. While the burden of policing for-
geries is placed unevenly among parties,54 all endure injury.
48. Cartier Int’l AG v. British Sky Broad. Ltd. [2014] EWHC (Ch) 3354, ¶
14 (“[Counterfeit goods] may subsequently be sold in a manner which de-
ceives the purchaser into believing that the goods are genuine . . . .”).
49. Counterfeit goods are damaging to the consumer because “the availa-
bility of counterfeit goods may have the effect of damaging the confidence of
some consumers in the legitimate market for such goods.” Id.
50. For example, trademarks of luxury brands aid the goodwill of the
sellers’ customers.
51. See Dianna Michelle Martinez, Fashionably Late: Why the United
States Should Copy France and Italy to Reduce Counterfeiting, 32 B.U. INT’L
L.J. 509, 518 (2014).
52. The Madrid Protocol, supra note 38.
53. An objective of trademark law, “[i]t is customary to refer to trademark
law as protecting a seller’s goodwill in its mark.” Robert G. Bone, Hunting
Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L.
REV. 547, 549 (2006).
54. Phillip A. Rosenberg, A Legislative Response to Tiffany v. Ebay: In
Search of an Online Commerce Certification Act, 36 RUTGERS COMPUTER &
TECH. L.J. 99, 108 (2009) (“[The] overwhelming status quo in the anti-
counterfeiting struggle burdens IPROs and law enforcement with most of the
‘heavy lifting’ despite their budgetary constraints . . . .”). Under U.S. Trade-
mark law, IPROs not policing their trademarks adequately and not maintain-
ing a degree of control over them may be deemed complete abandonment of
the mark. Id. at 108 n.42.
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With the availability of counterfeit goods on the Internet ex-
pected to grow exponentially,55 the burden of policing must be
shifted to avoid drastic increases in the injuries sustained by
all parties.56
1. IPROs
The effects of counterfeiting are most self-evident for IPROs.
Although IPROs police websites that intermediaries control,57
the counterfeit epidemic is so widespread and fast-paced that
IPROs cannot view the counterfeits posted online until the
moment they are accessible by the general public.58 Thus, de-
spite valiant efforts taken to protect their trademarks,59 both
large multinational companies and small IPROs are subject to
injuries sustained by forgeries of their trademarks.60 Such
55. In 2005, trade in counterfeit goods was estimated to equal $200 billion.
See BASCAP Social Impact Study, supra note 9, at 8–9. Today, that statistic
has risen to $1.8 trillion. See Prominent Chinese Banks Are at the Center of
the $1.8 Trillion Counterfeit Money Market, BUS. INSIDER (May 8, 2015)
http://www.businessinsider.com/prominent-chinese-banks-are-at-the-center-
of-the-18-trillion-counterfeit-money-market-2015-5. Counterfeting has grown
10,000 percent in the past two decades. See CHAUDHRY & ZIMMERMAN, supra
note 4 at 9.
56. Counterfeiting has resulted in over €200 billion losses for the world
economy, and that loss is projected to increase. See Brussels Memo, supra
note 42.
57. See Brief for Council of Fashion Designers of Am., Inc. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Appellants, Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir.
2010) (No. 08-3947-CV), 2008 WL 8595307, at *5–6 [hereinafter Brief for
Council of Fashion Designers of Am.] (“[The Tiffany ruling essentially] re-
quires all fashion designers to police eBay and other web sites around the
world, 24 hours a day, and 365 days a year . . . . [F]ashion designers, big and
small, are under the obligation to spend unspecified amounts of resources to
police those marketplaces around the clock. Because it would be nearly im-
possible . . . to meet this new burden, the district court has critically weak-
ened the fight against counterfeiting.”).
58. See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 485 (S.D.N.Y.
2008).
59. IPROs also use “holograms, ‘special package design[s],’ micro printing,
chemically sensitized particles, specialty inks, watermarks, tamper evident
labels, encrypted bar codes, and chemical tracers in an effort to deter counter-
feiting.” Rosenberg, supra note 54, at 122.
60. While large IPROs may complain the loudest about the effects of coun-
terfeiting, small companies in counterfeiting “hotspots” can also be drastical-
ly affected. See Counterfeiting: Imitating Property is Theft, supra note 7.
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harm is in the form of loss of goodwill,61 as well as monetary
damages.62 For some small IPROs, the threat is heightened to
the complete ruin of the company.63 For larger companies, the
costs of policing trademarks are also burdensome.64 To help al-
leviate this harsh reality, jurisdictions should lessen the re-
sponsibilities imposed on IPROs.65
2. Consumers
The effects of counterfeiting experienced by consumers are
inescapable as well. However, the goods are not viewed by con-
sumers as hazardous but rather as a normal purchase because
these counterfeit goods have become so widely available, which
therefore drastically exacerbates the overall problem. Physical-
61. Haig Simonian, Counterfeiting: Silence of the Brands Hides Fight
against Fakes, FIN. TIMES (June 6, 2011),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/89366414-8dad-11e0-a0c4-
00144feab49a.html#axzz3GvauP2IH (“[Counterfeits] erode a luxury brand’s
expensively established and marketed core values.”); Cartier, [2014] EWHC
(Ch) 3354, ¶ 14 (“The circulation of substandard counterfeit goods which are
not easily distinguished from the genuine articles can easily damage the rep-
utation of the latter”).
62. See Kristi Ellis, Copyright vs. Vendor: Battle Over Copyright Issue Hits
Congress, WOMEN’S WEAR DAILY (Feb. 15, 2008),
http://www.wwd.com/business-news/government-trade/designer-vs-vendor-
battle-over-copyright-issue-hits-congress-465497 (reporting $12 billion in lost
revenues in 2006 due to counterfeiting and piracy in the fashion industry
alone); Cartier, 3354 EWHC (Ch) ¶ 14 (noting that IPROs “may lose sales” as
a result of counterfeit goods in the market).
63. Some small companies cannot afford or produce the manpower to ap-
propriately protect against illegal reproduction. See Brief for Council of Fash-
ion Designers of Am., supra note 57, at *9–10 (noting that small fashion
houses are unable to hire sufficient staff to monitor infringing online transac-
tions, let alone attorneys to advise on such issues); Sarah E. Needleman &
Kathy Chu, Entrepreneurs Bemoan Counterfeit Goods: Small Businesses
Have Fewer Resources to Fight Fakes on Internet, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 28, 2014)
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230416360457952979014084
1718 (“They lack the financial and technological resources that large compa-
nies have to deter or fight offenders”). As a result, young designers cannot
survive the dilution of their designs. See Ellis, supra note 62.
64. See Counterfeiting: Imitating Property is Theft, supra note 7 (noting
Procter & Gamble’s statement that $3 million is spent each year on “fighting
the copycats”); Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 484
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[O]ver the past five years, Tiffany has budgeted $14 million
to anti-counterfeiting efforts . . . .”).
65. IPROs are solely responsible for policing their marks on the Internet.
See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 109 (2d Cir. 2010).
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ly, counterfeit products pose large, imminent risks66 to con-
sumers’ health67 and safety. For example, faulty, counterfeit
parts have been the cause of plane crashes, which have result-
ed in multiple deaths.68 In broad terms, the counterfeit market
also affects the welfare of the general public, whether or not
the person purchased a knockoff product.69 For example, there
exists a causal relationship between counterfeit goods and job
loss.70 Yet despite this fact, consumers view counterfeits as
normal products in the market rather than the destructive
66. Note however, that research suggests many consumers are actually
unaware of the deceptive and dangerous nature of counterfeit goods. See Lyn
Amine & Peter Magnusson, Targeting Buyers of Counterfeit Goods, WIPO
(Sept. 2008),
http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2008/05/article_0008.html.
67. The manufacture and distribution of counterfeit pharmaceuticals is a
major threat to public health. Ambassador Michael B.G. Froman, Off. Of the
U.S. Trade Representative, 2014 Special 301 Report to Congress, at 20 (2014),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/USTR%202014%20Special%20301%20Repo
rt%20to%20Congress%20FINAL.pdf (“[T]he bulk active pharmaceutical in-
gredients (API) that are used to manufacture pharmaceuticals that bear
counterfeit trademarks are not made according to good manufacturing prac-
tices. Hence, these products may contain sub-standard and potentially haz-
ardous materials.”).
68. See Counterfeiting: Imitating Property is Theft, supra note 7. In 1989,
the crash of a Partnair plane was caused by faulty counterfeit bolts holding
the tail to the body of the plane; a 2011 American Airlines flight may have
also been caused by counterfeit parts. Id. Counterfeit automotive parts also
pose major risks to consumer safety. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION &
DEV., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF COUNTERFEITING AND PIRACY 148 (2008),
http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/trade/the-economic-
impact-of-counterfeiting-and-piracy_9789264045521-en#page1 (“Counterfeit
brake pads, hydraulic hoses, engine and chassis parts, suspension and steer-
ing components and airbag mechanisms are among the items that have been
counterfeited.”); Marc Santia, Counterfeit Brake Pads Sold to NYC Taxi Op-
erators: FBI, NBC N.Y. (Feb. 20, 2013),
http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/FBI-Raid-Fake-Taxi-Part-Warehouse-
New-York-New-Jersey-191828741.html.
69. Counterfeiting decreases the number of available jobs. See Press Re-
lease, Int’l Anti-Counterfeiting Coal., Senator Nia Gill Fights Piracy, Protects
New Jersey’s Consumers and Businesses, IACC (Nov. 15, 2007),
http://www.iacc.org/announcements/senator-nia-gill-fights-piracy-protects-
new-jerseys-consumers-and-businesses (“Counterfeiters have put over three-
quarters of a million Americans out of work . . . .”).
70. See Brussels Memo, supra note 42 (“[F]ake goods create unfair compe-
tition for European artisans and businesses, harming legitimate enterprises
and increasing unemployment . . . .”).
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force that they truly are.71 Further, such purchases can nega-
tively affect the consumer’s trust in the market,72 as well as
pose financial risks for the consumer if the product is faulty
and/or is not delivered.73 Lastly, as it is a criminal offense to
purchase a counterfeit good in some countries,74 the market
poses criminal risks to consumers as well. Paradoxically,75 de-
spite all of these imminent threats, consumer demand for coun-
terfeit goods still remains high, and consumers view these
goods as ordinary purchases.76 For 78 percent of consumers, a
71. See Rebecca Smithers, Surge in Purchases of Consumer Goods,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 1, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/money/2013/oct/02/counterfeit-goods-surge-uk
(quoting Mark James of PwC’s anticounterfeiting team stating, “Counterfeits
have an obvious impact on profit and jobs, yet people increasingly see access
to fakes as a normal, consumer choice.”); Jason Carpenter & Karen Edwards,
U.S. Consumer Attitudes toward Counterfeit Fashion Products, 8 J. TEXTILE&
APPAREL, TECH. & MGMT. 1, 9 (2013),
http://ojs.cnr.ncsu.edu/index.php/JTATM/article/view/2761 (“There appears to
be an overall trend toward consumers viewing counterfeit products of various
categories as normal goods that are legitimately within our economy.”).
72. See Kurt M. Saunders & Gerlinde Berger-Walliser, The Liability of
Online Markets for Counterfeit Goods: A Comparative Analysis of Secondary
Trademark Infringement in the United States and Europe, 32 NW. J. INT’L L.
& BUS. 37, 38 (2011) (“[U]nknowing consumers may conclude that the knock-
offs are genuine and that all items made by the actual luxury brand are infe-
rior or not worth the upscale price . . . .”).
73. In 2012, Internet fraud, including “bogus online merchandise scams”
accounted for over half of all scams reported. Familiar Faces in 2012 Top Ten
Scams Report, NAT’L CONSUMERS LEAGUE (Mar. 2013),
http://www.nclnet.org/familiar_faces_in_2012_top_ten_scams_report.
74. In the United States and “almost everywhere else in the world,” liabil-
ity only lies on the selling side, not the buying side. However, in France and
Italy, buying fraudulent goods is illegal. See Jennifer Saranow Schultz, The
Legality of Buying Knockoffs, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2010),
http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/28/the-legality-of-buying-
knockoffs/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 (quoting Susan Scafidi). In Italy,
consumers can be fined, whereas in France consumers can also face fines and
even jail time. See id.
75. There is a “fundamental contradiction” in consumer attitudes towards
counterfeit goods. See Lee Hoe et al., Fakin’ It: Counterfeiting and Consumer
Contradictions, 6 EUR. ADVANCES CONSUMER RES. 60, 67 (2003),
http://www.acrwebsite.org/search/view-conference-
proceedings.aspx?Id=11444.
76. See Travis D. Johnson, Supply and Demand: The Need for a Compre-
hensive Approach to Combating Counterfeits, IACC,
http://www.worldtrademarkreview.com/Intelligence/Anti-
counterfeiting/2015/Introduction/Supply-and-demand-the-need-for-a-
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major driving factor behind their counterfeit purchases is
availability of the goods.77 Another reason is the commonly
held belief that the lower price of the counterfeit good com-
pared to the genuine article outweighs the contrasting quality
of the illegitimate good.78 With the purchase normalization of
these goods comes the notion that consumers should not be ex-
pected to quell the problem. The market is continuously grow-
ing,79 and with the persistent destructive appeal, it is up to the
authoritative bodies to quash it.
3. Governmental Regimes
Like IPROs and consumers, government bodies are affected
by the effects of the counterfeit market—both in the United
States and EU alike. National crises, such as terrorist attacks
and debt crisis have links to the counterfeit trade. For example,
there is a close connection between imitation goods and nation-
al security crises—multiple terrorist bombings are linked to the
counterfeit market. For example, sales from a counterfeit t-
shirt shop in Manhattan funded the 1993 truck bomb attack on
the World Trade Center, while counterfeit sales also partially
funded the 2004 train bombings in Madrid.80 Additionally, the
comprehensive-approach-to-combating (last viewed Oct. 13, 2015) (“Although
illegal, the trafficking of counterfeit goods is big business . . . . As long as the
consumer market for counterfeit goods remains, goods will be supplied to fill
it.”).
77. See Mary Lambkin & Yvonne Tyndall, Brand Counterfeiting: A Mar-
keting Problem That Won’t Go Away, 20 IRISHMARKETINGREV. 35, 40 (2009).
78. See Carpenter & Edwards, supra note 71, at 4 (“Although consumers
might recognize that counterfeit products are not equal in quality compared
to authentic products, some consumers, especially from Western cultures,
may be willing to sacrifice quality to purchase a lower priced counterfeit ver-
sion.”).
79. See Gene Quinn, Counterfeiting, A Growing Worldwide Problem, IP
WATCHDOG (Aug. 14, 2011),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2011/08/14/counterfeiting-a-growing-worldwide-
problem/id=18428/ (“[U]ntil individuals who purchase counterfeits cease their
fueling of the industry the problems will only continue to grow.”).
80. Katherine B. Felice, Fashioning A Solution for Design Piracy: Consid-
ering Intellectual Property Lawin the Global Context of Fast Fashion, 39
SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 219, 223 (2011). See generally Counterfeit Goods–
–Easy Cash for Criminals and Terrorists: Hearing on Terrorism Financing
Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th
Cong. 1 (2005) (statement of Sen. Susan M. Collins, Chairman, S. Comm. on
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counterfeit market taps into taxpayer dollars81 and ultimately
reduces the amount of funds available to spend on overall pub-
lic welfare.82 In response, governments allocate large amounts
of time83 and resources84 to control the market. Despite inter-
national harmonizing efforts to suppress the counterfeit epi-
demic,85 however, the growing problem still exists.86
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs) (linking terrorism to counter-
feit products).
81. Approximately €62 billion in taxpayer funds is lost from counterfeiting
annually, which therefore reduces the availability of funds for public welfare.
See BASCAP Social Impact Study, supra note 9, at 44.
82. Counterfeiting and related activities cost G20 nations approximately
$125 billion annually. See id. at 7; Counterfeiting: Imitating Property is Theft,
supra note 7 (“As counterfeiters rarely pay duties or taxes, governments lose
further revenue.”).
83. Consumer complaints relating to online auction fraud placed with the
U.S. Federal Trade Commission increased from 4,400 in 1998 to over 25,000
in 2001. See Kyo M. Dolan, Internet Auction Fraud: The Silent Victims, J.
ECON. CRIMEMGMT. 1, 2–3 (2004).
84. In the United States, the number of IP-infringing goods seized by bor-
der patrol in 2013 increased by 7 percent to 24,361 (from 22,848 in 2012), had
a retail value totaling $1,743,515,581 (had they been genuine), and the items
most seized were apparel and accessories totaling 35 percent of the seizures
(up 6 percent from 2012). Intellectual Property Rights Seizure Statistics: Fis-
cal Year 2013, DEP’T. HOMELAND SECURITY,
http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2013%20IPR%20Stats.pdf
(last visited Mar. 28, 2016). In the EU, 87,000 IP-infringing goods were seized
by customs in 2013 (the vast majority “most probably as a result of internet
sales”), had a retail value totaling €768 million (had they been genuine), and
the items most seized were apparel and accessories totaling 12 percent of the
seizures. Counterfeit and Piracy: Facts and Figures, EUR. COMM’N,
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/customs/customs_controls/counterfeit_pi
racy/statistics/index_en.htm (last visited Oct. 10 2015) (citing statistics from




85. The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (“ACTA”) was signed by the
United States, Australia, Canada, Korea, Japan, New Zealand, Morocco, and
Singapore, with additional support from the EU, to increase criminal sanc-
tions for counterfeiting and strengthening intellectual property rights. Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
http://www.ustr.gov/acta (last visited Oct. 12, 2015). While the intentions
appear promising, the realities are not so bright; unfortunately, ACTA has
been regarded as ineffective due to its “problematic design.” Miriam Bitton,
Rethinking the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement’s Criminal Copyright
Enforcement Measures, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 67, 70–71 (2012). The
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4. Intermediaries
Lastly, intermediaries also experience effects of the counter-
feit market. While the consequences are not as severe and may
even possibly be beneficial in some cases,87 intermediaries nev-
ertheless claim that they also are negatively affected by coun-
terfeit items sold on their platforms.88 The main threat to their
businesses, however, are litigation costs in fighting IPROs.89
This threat, combined with the burdens intermediaries face
due to the presence of counterfeits in the market,90 suggests
that like the other stakeholders in the counterfeit epidemic,
intermediaries would also be relieved if a more ardent ap-
problematic design involves a “lack of transparency and secrecy in the nego-
tiating process, [a] limited number of negotiating participants, [an] undemo-
cratic process, and [a] lack of accountability.” Id. Another criticism of ACTA’s
failures has been the “country club” approach it has taken by “ignoring im-
portant players such as Brazil, China, India, and Russia” in implementing
the Agreement. Peter Yu, Enforcement, Enforcement, What Enforcement?, 52
IDEA: INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 239, 268–69 (2012). Thus, ACTA for the most part
remains unreliable in the fight against counterfeiting, and as such, other
measures must be taken by the authorities.
86. See BASCAP Social Impact Study, supra note 9, at 3. For increases in
the counterfeit market, see supra note 55.
87. In a stark contrast, eBay expects its revenues to increase over the next
few years, while IPROs are losing revenues. See Ali Sternburg & Matt Schru-
ers, Modernizing Liability Rules to Promote Internet Trade, COMPUTER &
COMM. INDUS. ASS’N (Sept. 28, 2013) at 2, http://www.ccianet.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/09/CCIA-Liability-Rules-Paper.pdf (reporting that eBay
had 2012 revenues of $14.1 billion and expects to enable $300 billion of global
commerce by 2015); Kimareanna Ross, Senator Calls for Federal Crackdown
on Counterfeit Wedding Gowns, STYLE OF THE CASE (Oct. 6, 2014),
http://thestyleofthecase.wordpress.com/2014/10/06/u-s-senator-from-new-
york-calls-for-federal-crackdown-on-counterfeit-wedding-gowns/ (noting that
annual revenue losses from counterfeit wedding gowns are as high as $300
million).
88. eBay’s 2013 Annual Report states, “The listing or sale by our users of
items that allegedly infringe the intellectual property rights of rights owners,
included pirated or counterfeit items, may harm our business.” EBAY INC





90. In the final six weeks of 2004, eBay received 125 complaints by users
regarding counterfeit products on its website relating to the plaintiff’s trade-
marks alone. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 487
(S.D.N.Y. 2008).
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proach were taken in removing counterfeits online. Namely,
this note suggests a shift from a reactive approach to a proac-
tive approach, with heightened removal responsibility placed
on the intermediary.
II. A SURVEY OFU.S. LAW ON SECONDARY LIABILITY FOR
ONLINE TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT
While the Lanham Act91 governs U.S. trademarks generally,
the Act is silent on the subject of intermediary liability. In at-
tempts to fill this gap, common law cases such as Inwood92 and
Tiffany93 laid the foundation for what constitutes secondary
liability in the United States, while the cases that follow ana-
lyze this notion. Despite the judiciary’s valiant attempts at ad-
dressing the issue, these cases also exhibit existing flaws in the
system.
A. The Lanham Act and Inwood: Foundations of Intermediary
Trademark Liability
In U.S. intellectual property law, the Lanham Act94 enforces
the protection of trademarks. The Lanham Act has three goals
relating to the health of the trademark: (1) to prevent consum-
er confusion, (2) protect the goodwill of businesses, and (3) en-
courage competition within the market. 95 The Lanham Act,
however, fails to address circumstances fostered by the digital
age.96 Specifically, the Act neglects to address intermediary lia-
bility, also known as secondary liability, for trademark in-
fringement.97 As a result, the authority to decide whether in-
termediaries can be held liable for trademark offenses, and
91. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–72, 1091–96, 1111–27, 1141, 1141a–41n (2010).
92. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982).
93. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).
94. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–72, 1091–96, 1111–27, 1141, 1141a–41n (2010).
95. See Fara S. Sunderji, Protecting Online Auction Sites from the Con-
tributory Trademark Liability Storm: A Legislative Solution to the Tiffany
Inc. v. eBay Inc. Problem, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 909, 917–18 (2005).
96. According to Elizabeth K. Levin, “the digital revolution has hindered
the Lanham Act’s goals of placing all trademark matters in one statute and
eliminating judicial obscurity.” Elizabeth Levin, A Safe Harbor for Trade-
mark: Reevaluating Secondary Trademark Liability After Tiffany v. Ebay, 24
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 491, 517 (2009).
97. By contrast, the Patent Act defines direct and contributory infringe-
ment for imposing liability on intermediaries. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000).
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what is required of them in regards to trademark protection, is
left to the judiciary.98
In response to the legislature’s silence on the subject,99 feder-
al courts framed a standard for secondary liability. First, in
Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc.,100 the U.S. Supreme
Court provided the foundation for secondary liability of inter-
mediaries. Inwood involved a pharmaceutical manufacturer
whose patent had expired on a specific, trademarked drug,
which was also manufactured in generic form.101 However, the
pharmaceutical manufacturer alleged that pharmacists were
mislabeling the generic medicine as the trademarked drug and
argued that this mislabeling was due to the generic drug’s
nearly identical appearance.102 Consequently, the pharmaceuti-
cal manufacturer brought suit against the generic drug manu-
facturers, despite the defendant never actually committing
trademark infringement.103 The Court introduced the theory of
“contributory liability” for intermediaries in relation to direct
infringement of a trademark. Contributory liability exists when
an intermediary intentionally induces another to infringe a
trademark or continues to supply a service to another when the
intermediary knows or should know that the other party is
engaging in trademark infringement.104 Focusing on the im-
portance of knowledge regarding the activities,105 intermediar-
98. Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d
1143, 1148 (7th Cir. 1992). The Seventh Circuit concluded that an intermedi-
ary “is responsible for the torts of those it permits on its premises ‘knowing or
having reason to know that the other is acting or will act tortiously[.].’” Id. at
1149 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 877(c) & cmt. d (AM. LAW.
INST. 1979)).
99. See discussion supra Part II.
100. 456 U.S. 844 (1982).
101. Id.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 850.
104. The Inwood standard recognizes contributory liability when manufac-
turer or distributor (1) “intentionally induces another to infringe a trade-
mark” or (2) “continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has
reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement.” Id. at 854.
105. For those intermediaries who lack knowledge of the direct infringe-
ment, they may still be found liable under vicarious liability. A party may be
vicariously liable if it exercises direct control “over a direct infringer when he
has both a legal right to stop or limit the directly infringing conduct, as well
as the practical ability to do so.” Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508
F.3d 1146, 1173 (9th Cir. 2007).
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ies who respond to notifications of infringement receive broad
protection under this standard. Tiffany further broadened this
protection.
B. Tiffany v. eBay
The Second Circuit decision in Tiffany amplified the broad
protection given under the Inwood standard by adding a good-
faith element to secondary trademark liability. High-end jewel-
ry brand Tiffany & Co. (“Tiffany”), brought suit against online
auction house eBay106 for trademark infringement, false adver-
tising, and trademark dilution, when it discovered that be-
tween 2004 and 2005 three-quarters of TIFFANY107 goods sold
on eBay’s website were counterfeit.108 During the case, the
court found that eBay, the intermediary, was not liable for di-
rect trademark infringement109 or contributory infringement.110
Rather than adhering to the already broad Inwood standard,
however, the court went beyond what was required by that
standard. The court found that eBay was also not liable for sec-
ondary liability because the company was a “good faith” user of
the trademark.111 In other words, eBay stood as a good-faith
106. Tiffany brought suit against eBay alleging that hundreds of thousands
of counterfeit silver jewelry items bearing Tiffany’s trademark were offered
for sale on eBay’s website from 2003–2006. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576
F. Supp. 2d 463, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
107. “TIFFANY” refers to Tiffany & Co.’s trademark.
108. Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 97.
109. eBay was within its lawful authority to use Tiffany’s trademark under
the test for direct infringement because “eBay used the mark to describe ac-
curately the genuine Tiffany goods offered for sale on its website.” Id. at 103.
110. Tiffany argued that eBay was liable because “all of the knowledge,
when taken together, puts [eBay] on notice that there is a substantial prob-
lem of trademark infringement.” Id. at 107. However, the Second Circuit de-
cided that generalized knowledge of trademark infringement was not enough,
and instead the intermediary must be provided with specific instances of in-
fringement. Id. (“[A] service provider must have more than a general
knowledge or reason to know that its service is being used to sell counterfeit
goods. Some contemporary knowledge of which particular listings are infring-
ing or will infringe in the future is necessary.”). This essentially requires an
IPRO to provide all instances of trademark infringement to every intermedi-
ary for notice-and-takedown of all illegal activity. See Brief of the Council of
Fashion Designers of Am., supra note 57, at *5–6 (“[I]t would be nearly im-
possible for many, if not most, fashion designers to meet this new burden.”).
111. Stacey L. Dogan, We Know It When We See It”: Intermediary Trade-
mark Liability and the Internet, STAN. TECH. L. REV. 7, 24 (2011).
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user of the trademark and was excused from liability, because
eBay complied with Tiffany’s notice-and-takedown requests,112
took steps to police eBay’s own website for counterfeits,113 and
allowed Tiffany to host an “About Me” profile on the eBay web-
site.114 Therefore, the result of Tiffany is that the burden to po-
lice the trademark lies entirely with the IPRO,115 and the in-
termediary is given broad protection so long as the intermedi-
ary is a good faith user of the trademark, and the intermediary
acts on specific instances of trademark infringement properly
when knowledge is raised by the IPRO.116
C. The Aftermath of the Tiffany Decision
Subsequently, courts have reinforced the standard set out in
Tiffany by applying the idea of good-faith user and the notion
of intent to different circumstances. In Gucci America, Inc. v.
Frontline Processing Corp., Inc., Gucci brought suit against a
group of intermediaries who sold credit card processing soft-
ware to a seller of counterfeit goods.117 This case exhibits that
liability not only extends to the seller of counterfeit goods but
also to parties that endorse the illegal activity. The court held
the group of intermediaries jointly and severally liable because
each intermediary had the knowledge to infringe on an IPRO’s
trademark rights. 118 Once again, in Rosetta Stone Ltd. v.
112. eBay “promptly removed all listings that Tiffany challenged as coun-
terfeit and took affirmative steps to identify and remove illegitimate Tiffany
goods.” Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 103.
113. The court spent a significant amount of time discussing eBay’s “fraud
engine,” “VeRo program,” and time and money spent to “promote trust and
safety on its website.” Id. at 98–99.
114. See id. at 99–100; Susan Kayser, The Duties of Online Service Provid-
ers, TRADEMARKS & BRANDS ONLINE (Mar. 27, 2014),
http://www.trademarksandbrandsonline.com/article/the-duties-of-online-
service-providers, (“eBay’s efforts and expenditures to prevent counterfeiting
clearly influenced the court’s ruling . . . .”).
115. See Brief of the Council of Fashion Designers of Am., supra note 57, at
*9.
116. See Dogan, supra note 111, at 26.
117. Gucci America, Inc. v. Frontline Processing Corp., Inc., 721 F. Supp. 2d
228, 236 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
118. In the court’s decision to hold the intermediaries accountable, motive
was a major factor in each instance. Id. at 239–40 (noting that card proces-
sors charged higher rates to merchants of counterfeit goods); id. at 248–49
(mentioning evidence that one of the intermediaries had reached out to “high-
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Google, Inc., intent was a central theme when Google, the in-
termediary, failed to escape liability.119 In this case, Rosetta
Stone brought suit against Google for “misleading Internet us-
ers into purchasing counterfeit Rosetta Stone software” when
Google sold ad words that advertised counterfeit Rosetta
Stone products.120 On appeal, the court—finding for Rosetta
Stone—determined that Google intended to cause customer
confusion between the counterfeit and the trademarked prod-
uct.121
The distinction between how trademarks and copyrights are
protected is best exhibited by the legislative burden structure
in place. In the United States, while the courts acknowledge a
duty on intermediaries to investigate notices of infringing con-
tent if first brought to their attention by IPROs, intermediaries
generally will not be found liable if their intent shows a lack of
a motive to encourage infringement,122 even when they have
general knowledge that infringement may be occurring
through their individual forums.123 Even though trademark
infringement may plague an intermediary’s channel, an IPRO
has to detect each incident for the intermediary to investigate
the material.124 And even then, if the intermediary deems it
risk” merchants, “including those who sell ‘replica products’”); id. at 250
(pointing to evidence of intermediaries’ knowledge of counterfeit sales).
119. Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 152 (4th Cir. 2012).
From September 2009 to March 2010, Rosetta Stone reported 190 cases of
infringing activity to Google. Id.
120. Id.
121. A Fourth Circuit court reversed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment for Google as to contributory infringement because “Google intend-
ed to cause confusion in that it acted with the knowledge that confusion was
very likely to result from its use of the mark.” Id. at 156.
122. Except if they willfully turn a blind eye to the obvious infringement.
Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 109–10 (2d Cir. 2010).
123. Id. at 107 (“[A] service provider must have more than a general
knowledge or reason to know that its service is being used to sell counterfeit
goods . . . .”).
124. It is up to an IPRO to uncover the trademark-infringing activity; if not,
the intermediary may continue to profit from it. See Ellie Mercado, As Long
as “It” is Not Counterfeit: Holding eBay Liable for Secondary Trademark In-
fringement in the Wake of LVMH and Tiffany Inc., 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 115, 143 (2013). (“[U]nless the trademark owner files a claim with the
site to end a suspicious auction, the listing remains available for bidding, and
eBay shares in the sales proceeds, regardless of whether the item is genuine
or not.”).
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appropriate, only the one instance of counterfeiting will be re-
moved. Unlike in copyright law—where intermediaries have a
statutory duty to block infringing material125—in trademark
law, because the legislation remains silent, courts have im-
posed unduly burdensome obligations on the IPROs to monitor
and protect the marks. This is despite the counterfeit indus-
try’s devastating impact on all parties involved. Rather than
require intermediaries to block websites and sellers who coun-
terfeit, courts inadequately necessitate an IPRO to detect indi-
vidual instances of trademark infringement, and only then ob-
ligate an intermediary to investigate the activities.126 If the in-
termediary then removes the content from their forum, this
eradication will add to the “good faith” element courts consider.
However, removal is not required by law; failing to take down
infringing material does not necessarily lead to automatic lia-
bility. In essence, the courts applied a Digital Millennium Cop-
yright Act (DMCA)-like safe harbor shield127 around inter-
mediaries, protecting them from liability in most instanc-
es.128 However, unlike the DMCA as it applies to copyright, the
courts have not heightened the burden on what is required of
the intermediaries for sufficient trademark protection. Thus,
while the intermediaries are given broad protection, the burden
is still placed on IPROs. Unlike copyright law, where the
DMCA requires removal of infringing material,129 which shifts
125. See Susan Neuberger Weller, Copyright Owners Using DMCA To Take
Down URLs, NAT’L L. REV., (June 22, 2012),
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/copyright-owners-using-dmca-to-take-
down-urls (noting that in the United States, the DMCA is currently being
used to block websites). See generally 17 U.S.C. § 512 (j) (1998).
126. See Serena Ng & Greg Bensinger, Lucrative Role as Middleman Puts
Amazon in Tough Spot, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 22, 2014),
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230441910457932228214167
4084 (“Amazon, eBay Inc. and other e-commerce companies also are protected
by a 2010 federal appeals-court ruling that put the onus on trademark hold-
ers to police the Web for counterfeit or other problematic merchandise.”).
127. See Michelle Leu, Authenticate This: Revamping Secondary Trademark
Liability Standards to Address a Worldwide Web of Counterfeits, 26
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 591, 598 (2011) (“[The] DMCA provides a series of safe
harbors to shield service providers from liability, provided that the service
providers remove infringing materials upon proper notification from copy-
right owners.”).
128. Id. at 607.
129. Once notified,
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the burden to the intermediaries by requiring them to take
steps to prevent infringement, in trademark law it is up to the
judiciary to decide what is required, and as has been exhibited,
the requirement is low.
III. A SURVEY OF EU LAW ON SECONDARY LIABILITY FOR
ONLINE TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT
The EU offers two methods for attaining intermediary liabil-
ity: primary liability and secondary liability. This Part will
conduct a comparative analysis between U.S. and EU law, pay-
ing particular attention to differing procedural aspects. This
Part will also discuss the E-Commerce directive of the EU in
the context of how it relates to secondary liability for trade-
mark infringement, and examine case law from different EU-
Member States regarding the differing degrees of judicial doc-
trine across Member-State lines.
A. EU Trademark Law
In the EU, like the United States, counterfeit goods can se-
verely damage a brand’s reputation and pressure IPROs finan-
cially.130 Additionally, the EU has also encouraged a notice-
and-takedown system on the part of intermediaries. However,
contrary to U.S. law, EU law allows for the possibility of great-
er intermediary focus. First, the EU protects the intermediary
by extending safe-harbor immunity to trademark law, rather
than keeping the protection within the realm of copyright
law.131 Second, Article 11 of the European Enforcement Di-
the service provider must expeditiously remove any material that is
claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity . . .
. then . . . take reasonable steps to notify the creator of the allegedly
infringing material that the material has been removed as a result of
the DMCA notice-and-takedown request.
Id. at 599 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(3), (g)(2)(A)).
130. Paul Maeyart, Grey and Counterfeit Goods in Transit: Trademark Law
in No-man’s Land, 2009 I AM 12 (2009), http://m.iam-
magazine.com/Intelligence/Brands-in-the-Boardroom/2009/Articles/Grey-and-
counterfeit-goods-in-transit-trademark-law-in-no-mans-land.
131. See Griffin M. Barnett et al., Who’s Left Holding the [Brand Name]
Bag? Secondary Liability for Trademark Infringement on the Internet (2013),
http://apps.americanbar.org/dch/thedl.cfm?filename=/PT020100/otherlinks_fil
es/20131126-SecondaryLiabilityforTrademarkInfringementontheInternet-
Report.pdf (“In essence, Article 14 [of the E-Commerce Directive] provides a
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rective132 requires Member States to ensure that “rights hold-
ers are in a position to apply for an injunction against interme-
diaries whose services are used by third parties to infringe an
intellectual property right.”133 Essentially, while an intermedi-
ary receives protection against damages, this protection is giv-
en only as long as the intermediary takes “appropriate, com-
mercially reasonable and technically feasible measures” to re-
duce trademark infringement on the internet.134 If they fail,
IPROs may bring suit against them to require their coopera-
tion.135
EU law is often formed by way of directives, amongst many
other forms such as Treaty provisions, regulations, and deci-
sions from the European Court of Justice (ECJ). As a result,
the law is at times minimally harmonizing, resulting in each
Member State enforcing its own law, with these mandates var-
ying from State to State. Strict adherence is not required. Es-
tablished practice dictates that “domestic legislation, and in
particular legislation specifically enacted or amended to im-
plement an EU directive, must be construed so far as is possi-
safe harbor comparable to Section 512(c) of the DMCA in US law, though
Article 14 applies equally to trademark, copyright, and also to some tort
claims under European national laws.”). Yet the intermediaries nevertheless
have a duty to remove infringement “under Article 14 of the e-Commerce Di-
rective . . . to remove or disable access to any infringing information expedi-
tiously upon becoming aware of it.” Susan M. Kayser et al., Combating Con-
tributory Infringement on the Internet, INTA BULL. (May 1, 2014)
http://www.inta.org/INTABulletin/Pages/CombatingContributoryInfringemen
tontheInternet.aspx. Under Article 14, an intermediary can avoid liability for
the information it hosts or stores if, “upon obtaining [actual] knowledge or
awareness [of illegal activities], [it] acts expeditiously to remove or to disable
access to the information.” Council Directive 2000/31, art. 14, 2000 O.J. (L
178) 1, 16 (EC).
132. Council Directive 2004/48, art 11, 2004 O.J. (L 195) 16 (EC).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. EU Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Counterfeit Goods, at 5
(May 4, 2010),
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/iprenforcement/docs/memorandum_0405
2011_en.pdf. Stakeholders, including IPROs and intermediaries, collabora-
tively crafted self-made rules in addition to the policies already in place by
the judiciary, entitled the Memorandum of Understanding (the “MoU”), to
balance the interests of both parties, to encourage e-commerce, and protect
intellectual property infringement online. See id. at 1. While the MoU is not
legally binding, its creation exhibits willingness on the part of EU stakehold-
ers to address cohesively intellectual property cyber issues.
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ble in conformity with, and to achieve the result intended by,
the directive.”136 When the EU adopts a Regulation, this type of
legislation is directly applicable in Member States and hence
there is no room for divergence. In contrast, Directives (wheth-
er minimally or maximally harmonizing) may include optional
provisions and their scope may be limited. Hence, subsequently
promulgated domestic laws can differ and often supersede. To
summarize the procedural differences between EU and U.S.
law regarding secondary liability:
A key difference between EU law under the E-Commerce Di-
rective and US law in regards to the Tiffany case is that un-
der EU law, failing to comply with notice or any safe harbor
provision will only eliminate your automatic immunity while
under US law, e.g. Tiffany, continuing to supply services after
notice would trigger liability. In Europe, liability will only
arise if the standard of accessory liability under national law
is also satisfied.137
Thus, in the United States, if an intermediary continues to en-
courage infringement when they have proper notice of the in-
stance, liability will be signaled. In the EU, such instance will
remove safe harbor protection, but liability will only arise if the
Member State’s national law dictates it.
B. EU Primary Liability and Article 14
When issues concerning the interpretation of EU law arise in
a national context, a court or tribunal in a Member State may
request a ruling from the ECJ. Thus, trademark regulation is
ultimately a matter of national law, but the sole interpreter of
the law is the ECJ as provided by the preliminary reference
procedure.138 Additionally, while decisions of the ECJ are only
136. Cartier Int’l AG v. British Sky Broad. Ltd. [2014] EWHC (Ch) 3354, ¶
89 (Eng.).
137. Barnett et al., supra note 131.
138. A Member State
may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to
enable it to give judgment, request the Court [of Justice of the Euro-
pean Union] to give a ruling thereon. Where any such question is
raised in a case pending before the highest court or tribunal of a
Member State, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before
the Court [of Justice of the European Union].
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binding on that specific Member State, the decision is often
quite persuasive to other Member States.139 An example of such
a case is L’Oréal SA v. eBay International.140 In 2007, L’Oreal
sent eBay a letter expressing its concerns “about the wide-
spread incidence of transactions infringing its intellectual
property rights on eBay’s European websites.”141 When eBay
replied, L’Oreal was not “satisfied with the response” and sub-
sequently brought suit.142 On appeal from the High Court of
England and Wales, the ECJ held that intermediaries can only
be liable if they are negligent in not reporting counterfeit goods
where: (a) they have taken an active role143 in the “knowledge
of, or control over,” the counterfeit goods,144 or (b) they are
“aware of facts or circumstances on the basis of which a dili-
gent economic operator should have identified” infringing activ-
ities and did not act to remove them.145
A second and recently settled case that addressed intermedi-
ary liability146 is Louis Vuitton Malletier SA (LVMH) v. Google
France. 147 Louis Vuitton (“LVMH”) brought suit in France
against Google when LVMH, as the IPRO, realized, in as early
as 2003, that Google’s “AdWord” feature148 allowed advertisers
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
art. 267, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47.
139. See Kayser et al., supra note 131 (“Even though judgments technically
are not binding on courts and administrative authorities in other Member
States, they still have a strong persuasive effect with regard to the interpre-
tation of harmonized European law.”).
140. Case C-324/09, L’Oréal SA v. eBay Int’ll AG, 2011 E.C.R. I-6011.
141. Id. ¶ 32.
142. Id. ¶ 33.
143. An intermediary plays an “active role” when it “provide[s] assistance
which entails, in particular, [optimizing] the presentation of the offers for
sale in question or promoting those offers.” Id. ¶ 116.
144. Id. ¶ 113.
145. Id. ¶ 120.
146. In September 2014, Google and LVMH signed a cooperation agree-
ment, ending years of litigation. See Google and LVMH Join Forces to Fight
Fakes, LVMH.COM (Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.lvmh.com/news-
documents/press-releases/lvmh-and-google-join-forces-to-fight-fakes/.
147. Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, Louis Vuitton Malletier SA (LVMH) v.
Google France SARL, 2010 E.C.R. I-2417.
148. Google’s “AdWord” service is a paid system that
enables any economic operator, by means of the reservation of one or
more keywords, to obtain the placing, in the event of a correspond-
ence between one or more of those words and that/those entered as a
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to purchase “AdWords” of luxury brand names, so that when a
consumer searched on Google for LVMH, Google automatically
offered links under its “sponsored links” tab149 to websites
that offered knockoff LVMH products.150 Using the previously
established standard in L’Oreal, the ECJ held that Google was
not liable because the intermediary’s position was “merely
technical, automatic and passive,” and thus did not hold the
sufficient degree of knowledge required.151 This was the court’s
holding, despite the ECJ stating that the “AdWords,” which
were sold by Google, could well cause “a likelihood of confusion
on the part of the public, which includes the likelihood of asso-
ciation between the sign and the trade mark.”152 Nevertheless,
the ECJ held that LVMH could still demand that Google re-
move the infringing advertisements,153 essentially fostering the
utilization of a notice-and-takedown scheme.
These cases exhibit telling details. They illustrate that com-
mon law standards may be utilized above multiple jurisdic-
request in the search engine by an internet user, of an advertising
link to its site.
Id. ¶ 23.
149. The “advertising link,” as referenced in the above note, “appears under
the heading ‘sponsored links’, which is displayed either on the right-hand
side of the screen . . . or on the upper part of the screen . . . . [t]hat advertis-
ing link is accompanied by a short commercial message.” Id. ¶¶ 23–24. To-
gether, the link and the message constitute the advertisement. Id. ¶ 24.
150. Id. ¶¶ 29–30; see also Kim Ross, Louis Vuitton, Google Ends 11-Year
Dispute, Join to Fight Counterfeits, STYLE OF THE CASE (Sept. 6, 2014),
http://thestyleofthecase.wordpress.com/2014/09/06/louis-vuitton-google-ends-
11-year-dispute-join-to-fight-counterfeits/ (“LVMH claimed Google violated its
trademarks by selling protected keywords such as ‘imitation’, ‘replica’, ‘fake’,
‘copies’ or ‘knock-offs’ that linked users who searched for ‘Vuitton’ and ‘LV’ to
websites selling counterfeit goods.”).
151. Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, 2010 E.C.R. I-2417, ¶¶ 114, 120.
152. Id. ¶ 3; see also Ross, supra note 149 (summarizing the holding of the
case, “Google cannot be held liable for trademark infringement when adver-
tisers choose keywords related to existing brands on its self-service AdWords
online advertising service and that the consumers could well become confused
by such keyword ads . . . .”).
153. See Christina Passariello & Max Colchester, EU Court Backs Google on
Linking Ad Sales to Brands: In Setback for LVMH, Court Clears Way for
Search Engine to Sell Advertising Linked to Trademarked Brand Names,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 24, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405274870489610457513913277839
8608 (stating that LVMH can demand that Google remove the ads).
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tions, even though common law may originate from different
Member States. Further, these cases also illustrate that even
though an intermediary receives payment for its part in host-
ing trademark infringement, they nevertheless may escape lia-
bility. However, what LVMH v. Google illustrates is willingness
of EU Courts to favor a notice-and-takedown system, which the
plaintiff in Cartier argued is ineffective, and to which the High
Court of England and Wales agreed.154
C. EU Secondary Liability and Article 11
EU-Member States have adopted disparate approaches to the
issue of secondary liability.155 The French cases, which found
eBay and other intermediaries liable under tort law for failing
to act reasonably, exhibit the most favorable approach.156 Other
Member States, however, have been unwilling to impose sec-
ondary liability where the intermediary hosts the infringe-
ment.157 In Germany, the Federal Supreme Court has also dis-
played a willingness to enforce a notice-and-takedown scheme,
albeit in limited circumstances. In Bundesgerichtshof, (“Inter-
net-Versteigerung II”), 158 Montres Rolex SA brought suit
against eBay over the sale of counterfeit ROLEX159 watches on
eBay’s website. The court held that “eBay must take reasona-
ble measures to prevent recurrence once it is informed of clear-
154. Richemont (the plaintiff in Cartier) argued that notice and takedown is
ineffective because, (1) “as soon as an offending website is taken down by one
host, the almost invariable response of the operator is to move the website to
a different host;” (2) “sooner or later, the website will be moved to a host, typ-
ically based offshore or in a non-Western jurisdiction, which does not respond
to notice and takedown requests;” and (3) “once that happens, the intellectual
property owner faces obvious difficulties in jurisdiction and/or enforcement if
it attempts to bring proceedings against the host to compel it to take down
the website.” Cartier Int’l AG v. British Sky Broad. Ltd. [2014] EWHC (Ch)
3354, ¶ 201 (Eng.). Justice Arnold agreed that notice-and-takedown systems
would unlikely “be effective to achieve anything other than short-term dis-
ruption” to trademark infringement. Id.
155. See Dinwoodie, supra note 24, at 484.
156. See id. (citing M. Leistner, Structural Aspects of Secondary (Provider)
Liability in Europe, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 75, 86 (2014)).
157. See id.
158. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 19, 2007, I
ZR 35/04 (Ger.), http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgi-
bin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=en&sid=c44eb2a83f373d
ef8b45527795eec1b0&Sort=3&nr=40136&pos=0&anz=4.
159. “ROLEX” refers to the trademark of Montres Rolex SA.
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ly identified infringement.”160 In Bundesgerichtshof (“Internet-
Versteigerung III”),161 the “leading case” for secondary liability
in Germany,162 the court observed that “more extensive control
obligations may be necessary when well-known or famous
trademarks, which are susceptible to infringements by third
parties, are at stake.”163 Unfortunately, while this statement is
beneficial to large IPRO stakeholders, it fails to recognize the
small businesses that arguably need protection just as much.
Thus in the EU, while intermediaries may escape liability in
certain circumstances, courts have begun to shift the burden of
responsibility in protecting trademarks to intermediaries by
enforcing notice-and-takedown schemes.
Article 11 of the Enforcement Directive offers another avenue
of imposing secondary liability, rendering the picture more
complex while also more harmonized. Article 11 requires Mem-
ber States to ensure that “right holders are in a position to ap-
ply for an injunction against intermediaries whose services are
used by a third party to infringe an intellectual property
right.”164 Thus, Article 11 might “offer the possibility of injunc-
tive relief even when the intermediary is within the safe har-
bour and thus immune from monetary liability.”165 This was
the issue Justice Arnold faced in the High Court portion of the
L’Oreal saga. In the case, he indicated that he might be willing
to offer limited relief under Article 11 to implement U.K. obli-
gations.166 When the case was brought before the ECJ, a prom-
inent issue was whether, under Article 11, IPROs could secure
injunctions against the intermediary to require the intermedi-
ary to prevent future infringements of those rights.167 While the
ECJ held that this would be permissible, the court left it up to
160. Eric Auchard, eBay Dealt Blow on Fake Rolexes by German Court,
REUTERS (Jul. 27, 2007), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2007/07/27/oukin-uk-
ebay-rolex-idUKN2736988920070727 (citing eBay’s 10-Q).
161. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 30, 2008, I
ZR 73/05 (Ger.), https://openjur.de/u/74820.html.
162. Kayser et al., supra note 131.
163. Id.
164. Directive 2004/48/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 195) 22; see Dinwoodie, supra note
24, at 489.
165. Dinwoodie, supra note 24 at 489–90 (emphasis added).
166. L’Oreal SA & Ors v EBay International AG & Ors, [2009] EWHC (Ch)
1094, ¶ 454 (Eng.).
167. Dinwoodie, supra note 24, at 490; see L’Oréal [2011] E.C.R. I-6011, ¶
126.
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the Member States to devise appropriate laws individually. The
ECJ did offer minimal guidance when stating that measures
must be “effective and dissuasive,” but also proportionate, and
that measures “need to strike a fair balance between the vari-
ous rights and interests.”168 Nevertheless, what this means in
practice is “not entirely clear.”169 While the ECJ has exhibited a
willingness to hold intermediaries accountable by delegating
individual Member States to both define and enforce Article 11,
the ECJ neglects to provide a harmonization tool, which is ul-
timately needed to prevent a prevalent and global epidemic like
online counterfeiting.
In summation, while intermediaries in the EU may escape li-
ability in certain circumstances, courts have begun to shift the
burden of responsibility in protecting trademarks to intermedi-
aries by enforcing notice-and-takedown schemes. Conversely,
U.S. courts remain hesitant to offer any sort of constructive re-
course for IPROs. Nevertheless, regardless of the legal struc-
tures currently in place in both the EU and the United States,
the counterfeit crisis remains a problem largely unresolved.
IV. THE COUNTERFEIT EPIDEMIC: A PROBLEMUNSETTLED
To the delight of IPROs,170 some intermediaries have taken
initiative to battle counterfeiting. For example, Taobao Mar-
ketplace,171 a subsidiary of the China-based company Alibaba,
signed separate agreements with the International AntiCoun-
terfeiting Coalition and LVMH, in which Taobao promised to
“proactively take down product listings of suspected counterfeit
goods and implement preventive measures to stop sellers from
listing fake items,” on Taobao’s own website.172 This followed
Taobao’s 2012 removal from the United States Trade Repre-
168. Dinwoodie, supra note 24, at 490; see L’Ore ́al [2011] E.C.R. I-6011, ¶¶
136, 141, 143.
169. Dinwoodie, supra note 24, at 491.
170. See James L. Bikoff et al., Hauling in the Middleman: Contributory
Trademark Infringement in North America, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 332,
340 (2010), (“[IPROs] are eager to have internet service providers such as
eBay and Twitter step up their precautionary activities.”).
171. Taobao Marketplace is referred to as the “Chinese version of eBay.”
Kayser et al., supra note 131.
172. J.T. Quigley, Taobao to Crack Down on Fake Louis Vuitton Goods,
DIPLOMAT (Oct. 11, 2013), http://thediplomat.com/2013/10/taobao-to-crack-
down-on-fake-louis-vuitton-goods/.
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sentative’s (“USTR”) “Notorious Markets” list, on which the in-
termediary was previously included due to its prolific part in
“the widespread availability of counterfeit and pirated goods in
its electronic marketplace.” 173 Additionally, Amazon 174 and
Google 175 have adopted anticounterfeiting programs, while
eBay has implemented its VeRO system,176 which all aim to
173. Lei Mei, New Ways to Combat Counterfeiting and Piracy in China, LAW
360 (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/511427/new-ways-to-
combat-counterfeiting-and-piracy-in-china.
174. See Ng & Bensinger, supra note 126 (“Amazon has policies to prevent
unauthorized sellers from listing some branded products, and its investiga-
tors comb through listings and customer reviews to identify sellers that may
be violating its rules.”). But see CBS News, Amazon Struggling to Keep Coun-
terfeits Off Market, Retailer Says, CBS NEWS (May 14, 2014),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/amazon-struggling-to-keep-counterfeits-off-
market-retailer-says/ (“The safety checks in place aren’t always strong
enough to stop [Amazon] from selling knock-offs to a customer . . . . because
counterfeiters are sending knock-offs to Amazon’s warehouses where they can
be mixed in with real products.”). See generally Amazon Anti-Counterfeiting
Policy, AMAZON,
http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?ie=UTF8&nodeId=20
1166010 (last visited Oct. 12, 2015).
175. See Hayley Tsukayama, Google Announces Anti-Counterfeit Measures,
WASH. POST (Mar. 13, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-
tech/post/google-announces-anti-counterfeit-
measures/2011/03/15/ABetJ9W_blog.html, (“First, [Google] will address reli-
able AdWords counterfeit claims within 24 hours. Second, it will work with
brand owners to identify counterfeiters and possibly expel them from the Ad-
Sense network. Finally, it has launched a center help page for reporting
counterfeits”). See generally Counterfeit Goods Policy, GOOGLE,
https://support.google.com/adwordspolicy/answer/176017?hl=en (last visited
Oct. 12, 2015).
176. See Olivia M. Fleming, Oh La La! How Will the Polarized Decisions of
the United States and France Regarding the Responsibility for Policing
Trademarks on Online Auction Sites Be Synthesized?, 20 IND. INT’L & COMP.
L. REV. 313, 323 (2010), (“VeRO is a notice and takedown system in which
intellectual property owners can inform eBay of any listing that potentially
infringes their rights, and then eBay can remove the listing.”). But see Jessica
L. Hilliard, Rights Versus Commerce: Balancing Online Trademark Policing
with the Emerging Online Marketplace, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L.
217, 234–45 (2011), (“In many cases, the eBay auction or sale is completed
before action can be taken by the trademark owner via the VeRO program . . .
. Trademark owners claim that the late notice of the VeRO system renders it
largely ineffective in policing alleged counterfeiting.”). See generally VeRo,
EBAY, http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/programs-vero-ov.html (last visited
Oct. 11, 2015).
906 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 41:2
remove instances of trademark infringements on their plat-
forms.
These initiatives, while promising on the surface, are indeed
quite counterfeit themselves. Despite the anticounterfeiting
measures taken by intermediaries, trademark infringement—
in particular the counterfeit epidemic—is an ever-growing cri-
sis. Luxury brands are the “fastest growing targets for counter-
feits” on the Internet.177 Further, despite its promise,178 Alibaba
remains a notorious intermediary for allegations of trade-
mark infringement.179 In October 2015, the American Appar-
el & Footwear Association lobbied to return Taobao to the
USTR “Notorious Markets” list for its continued widespread
dissemination of counterfeit goods.180 Additionally, certain
sellers refuse to sell their products on Amazon’s website be-
cause they feel the intermediary is not active enough in reduc-
ing trademark infringement on its platform.181 In eBay’s 2013
177. Ashley Bumatay, A Look at Tradekey: Shifting Policing Burdens from
Trademark Owners to Online Marketplaces, 11 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 341, 341
(2015).
178. See discussion supra Part IV.
179. In May 2015, Gucci, Yves Saint Laurent, and other luxury brands un-
der the name Kering SA filed suit in the United States—which was later di-
rected to mediation—against Alibaba, alleging the intermediary’s shopping,
marketing, and payment platforms “knowingly make it possible for an army
of counterfeiters to sell their illegal wares throughout the world,” while being
“compensated by the counterfeiters for enabling the illegal sale of counterfeit
products.” Matthew Bultman, Kering To Resume Mediation In Alibaba Coun-
terfeit Case, LAW360 (Nov. 13, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/726682
(citing Complaint, Gucci Am. Inc. et al v. Alibaba Grp. Holdings Ltd. et al,
No. 15-03784 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)).
180. Bill Donahue, Alibaba Site Belongs On ‘Notorious Markets’ List, USTR
Told, LAW 360 (Oct. 6, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/711374/alibaba-
site-belongs-on-notorious-markets-list-ustr-told. In response, the USTR pub-
lished a warning to Alibaba (and Taobao), urging the company to create a
“stronger and more efficient system” to combat counterfeiting “without de-
lay.” See U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 2015
OUT-OF-CYCLE REVIEW OF NOTORIOUS MARKETS 8 (2015),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/USTR-2015-Out-of-Cycle-Review-Notorious-
Markets-Final.pdf.
181. For example, Estée Lauder Cos. does not distribute its products on
Amazon, and Johnson & Johnson temporarily halted sales on the website in
2013. See Serena Ng & Jonathan D. Rockoff, Amazon and J&J Clash Over
Third-Party Sales, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 10, 2013),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303460004579190270427483
810.
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Annual Report, the company conceded that they “may be una-
ble to prevent [its] users from selling unlawful or stolen goods
or unlawful services, or selling goods or services in an unlawful
manner.”182 Furthermore, IPROs sue companies that sell their
alleged counterfeit products on eBay and Amazon.183 Perhaps
most profound is the statistic that the global counterfeit mar-
ket has reached a value of $1.77 trillion, a drastic increase from
an estimated $550 billion in 2008.184
A. Consumer Demand
The question remains as to why trademark infringement is
rapidly rising when efforts to quell the issue have been imple-
mented by both IPROs and intermediaries. One reason is the
availability of the Internet,185 which has facilitated the accessi-
bility of counterfeit goods.186 For example, over six million new
items are listed on eBay each day, with one hundred million
seller postings on the website at any moment.187
182. EBAY ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 88, at 23.
183. For example, Dolce and Gabbana recently brought suit in the District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio against eyewear manufacturer TXT
for deliberate trademark infringement and civil counterfeiting. See Kim Ross,
Dolce & Gabbana Alleges Manufacturer Imitates Luxury Brands’ Trade-
marks, Sues for Trademark Infringement, Counterfeiting, STYLE OF THE CASE
(Nov. 9, 2014), http://thestyleofthecase.wordpress.com/2014/11/09/dolce-
gabbana-alleges-manufacturer-imitates-luxury-brands-trademarks-sues-for-
trademark-infringement-counterfeiting/. According to the complaint, TXT
sells the products “specifically on eBay [and] Amazon.” Id.
184. See BASCAP Social Impact Study, supra note 9, at 5.
185. See Knock-offs Catch On: Fake Goods are Proliferating, to the Dismay
of Companies and Governments, ECONOMIST (Mar. 4, 2010) [hereinafter
Knock-offs Catch On], http://www.economist.com/node/15610089 (“Thanks to
the rise of the internet . . . counterfeit goods are everywhere.”); Cartier Int’l
AG v. British Sky Broad. Ltd. [2014] EWHC (Ch) 3354, ¶ 13 (Eng.) (“The in-
ternet has become an increasingly important channel of trade in counterfeit
goods.”).
186. In Cartier, the court noted that in 2014, “the top six categories of goods
seized (measured by number of cases) were the kind of goods often shipped by
post or courier after an order via the internet.” Cartier, [2014] EWHC (Ch)
3354, ¶ 13 (citing Report on EU Customs Enforcement of Intellectual Property
Rights, at 7 (2014),
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/customs/customs_c
ontrols/counterfeit_piracy/statistics/2015_ipr_statistics.pdf).
187. Tiffany (NJ) Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d at 475.
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In conjunction with Internet availability, another reason is
consumer demand.188 A 2009 study commissioned by Business
Action to Stop Counterfeiting and Piracy, the International
Chamber of Commerce’s intellectual property initiative, found
that “[e]ighty percent of consumers surveyed reported having
bought some kind of [counterfeit] product at least once.”189 Evi-
dence shows that while consumers understand that intellectual
property protection is important, consumers continue to drive
demand that encourages intellectual property destruction.190
For example, a 2013 EU study by Office for Harmonization in
the Internal Market found that “96% of Europeans consider
that ‘it is important that inventors, creators and performing
artists are able to protect their rights and be paid for their
work.’”191 Yet counterintuitively, “34% of Europeans, and 52%
of 15 to 24-year-olds, believe that buying counterfeit products is
‘a smart purchase that enables you to have the items that you
want while preserving your purchasing power.’”192 Coming full
circle, one of the predominant drivers behind counterfeit pur-
chases—a reason consumers consider counterfeiting “socially
acceptable”—is the availability of the trademark-infringing
goods.193 Thus, availability drives consumer demand194—mostly
188. Consumer demand is a major driving factor in the counterfeit sales
market. See Saurabh Verma, Rajender Kumar, & P.J. Philip, Economic and
Societal Impact of Global Counterfeiting and Piracy, 6 PACIFIC BUS. R. INT’L,
98, 99 (2014) (citing Gary Bamossy and Debra L. Scammon, L., Product
Counterfeiting: Consumers and Manufacturers Beware, 12 ADVANCES IN
CONSUMER RES. 334 (1985)) (“[V]arious researchers have argued that con-
sumer demand for counterfeits is one of the leading causes of the existence
and upsurge in growth of the counterfeiting phenomenon.”).
189. BASCAP, Research Report on Consumer Attitudes and Perceptions on
Counterfeiting and Piracy 12 (2009) [hereinafter BASCAP Consumer Re-
search Report], http://www.iccwbo.org/Advocacy-Codes-and-
Rules/BASCAP/BASCAP-Research/Consumer-attitudes-and-perceptions/.
190. See generally Trevor Little, Public Awareness of IP Crime Rises, but
Counterfeit Purchases Continue, WORLD TRADEMARK REV. (Oct. 10, 2014),
http://www.worldtrademarkreview.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=11c772bc-4b8e-
4e79-bf62-c0647a3a18a7.
191. Office for Harmonization in the Internal Mkt., European Citizens and
Intellectual Property: Perception, Awareness and Behaviour 1 (2013) [herein-
after EU Perception Study], https://oami.europa.eu/tunnel-
web/secure/webdav/guest/document_library/observatory/documents/IPContrib
utionStudy/25-11-2013/european_public_opinion_study_web.pdf.
192. Id. at 4.
193. See BASCAP Consumer Research Report, supra note 189, at 8.
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by way of the Internet—and consequently, consumer demand
drives the counterfeit market. Therefore, the most logical solu-
tion to subjugate the counterfeit issue would be to reduce the
overall availability of counterfeit goods. As such, while the
steps taken by intermediaries are valiant, further regulation
must be implemented to help eliminate the problem. Specifical-
ly, regulation must mandate that intermediaries block websites
and sellers that infringe trademarks, not just specific instances
of trademark violations. The United Kingdom has become the
first EU Member State to take a step in this right direction.
V. RETHINKING THE PARADIGM
In the United States, while the Tiffany standard encouraging
notice and takedown is widely used,195 courts are beginning to
issue permanent “landmark” injunctions196 in response to the
growing counterfeit epidemic. In the EU, the United Kingdom
was the first EU-Member State to require intermediaries to
block websites.197 However, other EU States still give broad
protection to intermediaries by only requiring a notice-and-
takedown scheme, thus decreasing the incentive to block coun-
terfeiting in larger quantities. In response to the growing coun-
terfeit issue, EU standards should be harmonized to increase
protection against trademark infringement.
A. Cartier: A Step in the Right Direction
In a monumental decision and the first of its kind in the EU,
the High Court of England and Wales took a stand against
counterfeiting with Cartier. 198 Richemont, on behalf of Car-
194. However, it is important to note that “[s]ocial and contextual factors
also play a part, particularly the place where the purchase is made, the pur-
chase situation and the legislation and enforcement mechanism in place.” Id.
at 35 (emphasis added).
195. See discussion, supra Section II.C.
196. See Chloe discussion, infra Section V.B..
197. See Julia Powles, Internet Service Providers Must Help Crack Down on
Fake Goods, High Court Rules, GUARDIAN (Oct. 20, 2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/oct/20/internet-service-
providers-fake-goods-high-court-rules (“[Cartier] is thought to be the first
ruling of its kind.”).
198. Cartier Int’l AG v. British Sky Broad. Ltd. [2014] EWHC (Ch) 3354
(Eng.).
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tier,199 sued five intermediaries200 in an effort to require the
intermediaries to “block, or at least impede, access by their re-
spective subscribers to six websites which advertise and sell
counterfeit goods.”201 The IPRO claimed that these six interme-
diaries, who at the time held “market share of some 95% of UK
broadband users,”202 and controlled at least 239,000 potentially
infringing websites,203 were negatively affecting the integrity of
Richemont’s trademarks, in particular by using the IPRO’s
long-standing status as a luxury brand204 to sell counterfeit
products of the branded items.205 After cease and desist letters
to the trademark-infringing websites were ignored,206 and it
was concluded that notice-and-takedown systems were ineffec-
tive,207 Richemont brought suit for a more permanent and ef-
fective solution.
199. Collectively, “Richemont” refers to “the owners of a large number of
[U.K.] Registered Trade Marks for CARTIER, MONTBLANC, IWC and other
brands.” Cartier, [2014] EWHC (Ch) 3354, ¶ 1. The court noted that Cartier is
“well known for its [jewelry] and watches, and also sells leather goods, writ-
ing instruments and a range of other accessories,” id. ¶ 15; Montblanc is “well
known for its writing instruments, and also sells watches, leather goods and
a range of related accessories,” id.; IWC is a “Swiss watch manufacturer,” id.
Together, under the Richemont name, the company had revenues totaling
“€10,649 million in the year ending 31 March 2014.” Id.




203. Id. ¶ 246.
204. The three brands have been in commerce since the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century, id. ¶ 15, and “the goods bearing these brand names
are expensive luxury items.” Id.
205. See id. ¶ 18 (“Each [website] sells replicas of a single brand, that is to
say, either Cartier or Montblanc or IWC. In each case, the [website] incorpo-
rates the brand name in its domain name. Some of the [websites] make it
very clear that the goods offered are replicas, whereas others make this much
less clear.”).
206. See id. ¶ 198. Justice Arnold, found the ignored letters “unsurprising,”
and since “the registrants all gave addresses outside the United Kingdom,
many in China, Richemont faced obvious difficulties of jurisdiction and/or
enforcement if they were to attempt to bring proceedings against the regis-
trants.” Id.
207. Richemont argued that notice-and-takedown scheme is ineffective for a
host of reasons. See id. ¶ 201.
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Once it was determined that the intermediaries had suffi-
cient knowledge of the infringing activities,208 (the preliminary
step in determining intermediary liability in the EU) the court
held that the burden of trademark protection should not fall
solely with the IPRO, but that the intermediary should police
as well. Justice Arnold reasoned that “the [intermediaries]
have an essential role in these infringements, since it is via the
[intermediaries’] services that the advertisements and offers
for sale are communicated to 95% of broadband users in the
UK.”209 While the court acknowledged that the requirement to
police trademark infringement would impose additional costs
on the intermediaries,210 Justice Arnold was not “persuaded,
however, that the implementation costs on their own lead to
the conclusion that the orders should be refused.”211 In the
court’s conclusion, the intermediaries were required to block
websites that infringe on the IPRO’s trademarks. The court
reasoned that it was not “persuaded that there [were] alterna-
tive measures open to [the IPRO] which would be equally effec-
tive, but less burdensome.”212
Cartier is crucial because it both lifted a portion of the bur-
den off IPROs, while imposing a greater responsibility onto the
intermediaries. As a “test case” for future litigation,213 Cartier
“could be followed by trademark owners both in the [United
Kingdom] and other countries, given the Internet is an increas-
ingly large channel for trade in counterfeit goods.”214
208. See id. ¶ 157.
209. Id. ¶ 155.
210. Id. ¶ 195. However, “[c]ounsel for Richemont submitted that the im-
plementation costs imposed on the [intermediaries] by website blocking or-
ders were very small compared to the [intermediaries’] total operating costs.”
Id. ¶ 249.
211. Id. ¶ 253.
212. Id. ¶ 217.
213. Id. ¶ 6 (“It is a test case, which, if successful, is likely to be followed by
other applications by Richemont and other trade mark owners, both here and
in other countries.”).
214. Daniel Thomas, ISPs Told to Block Fake Luxury Goods Sales, FIN.
TIMES (Oct. 17, 2014), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2f463ed8-5605-11e4-a3c9-
00144feab7de.html.
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B. Chloe: American Hope?
Like Cartier, a U.S. District Court recently ordered a “land-
mark”215 decision when the court ordered a group of intermedi-
aries to monitor their content for infringement. In Chloe SAS v.
Sawabeh Info. Servs. Co, six luxury brands sued the online
marketplace TradeKey.com.216 While the luxury brands did not
send any notices of infringement to the intermediary, a U.S.
District Court in California still found the intermediary liable
based on intent.217 By fostering and encouraging the sales of
counterfeit goods,218 the intermediary “deliberately established
a haven for trademark infringement and counterfeiting.”219 As
a result, the District Court judge, along with the other re-
quirements common to U.S. secondary liability case law,220 or-
dered TradeKey to monitor their websites of illegal infringing
activity on an on-going basis.221
While only a District Court decision, the order’s underlying
remedial effects should not be discounted. Chloe is similar to
Cartier in that the court mandated the intermediary to monitor
its website content. Rather than requiring the intermediary to
react to instances of infringement, as demonstrated in the Tif-
fany decision,222 the court here insisted that the intermediary
take a proactive approach to its website content.
C. A Proactive Rather than Reactive Solution
The United States and the EU should take both the ruling
and logic of Cartier and implement it into legislation. More
specifically, governments should abandon notice-and-takedown
schemes and instead heighten potential liability by requiring
215. Bumatay, supra note 177, at 353.
216. See Chloe SAS v. Sawabeh Info. Servs. Co, No. CV 11-04147 GAF
MANX, 2012 WL 7679386, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 3, 2012).
217. See Kayser et al., supra note 131.
218. TradeKey’s website had a section dedicated to “replica” goods. Further,
a “TradeKey salespersons approved, encouraged, and assisted Plaintiffs’ in-
vestigators to offer ‘replica’ items for sale, stating that doing so was ‘not a
problem,’ and that the sale of counterfeit luxury goods was ‘one of
[TradeKey’s] main industries.’” Chloe, 2012 WL 7679386 at *5.
219. Id. at *22.
220. Such as requiring a notice-and-takedown system. See Bumatay, supra
note 177, at 354.
221. Chloe, 2012 WL 7679386 at *22.
222. See discussion of Tiffany supra Part II.
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website blocking. Doing so will shift the burden onto the inter-
mediary: while the IPRO will be required to detect infringe-
ment, the intermediary will be required to block the infringing
pages entirely, and not just the one specific instance of in-
fringement.223 This system would be more effective and less
burdensome than notice-and-takedown schemes.224 Further,
increasing liability of the intermediary “may act as a deterrent
for future infringing activities by transforming [intermediar-
ies] into trademark owners’ policing partners.”225 Additional-
ly, scholars have argued that the intermediaries, as the least
cost avoider, should receive some of the burden of policing.226
While costs are of course a valid consideration,227 the Cartier
court determined that the costs imposed on the intermediaries
would be “proportionate and strike a fair balance between the
223. The shared burden would be as follows:
the [IPROs] bear the costs of the application (other than costs occa-
sioned by the [intermediaries] resistance to an order), while the [in-
termediaries] bear the costs of implementation. Similarly, the
[IPROs] bear the costs of monitoring the targeted websites after im-
plementation of the order and notifying the [intermediaries] of up-
dates, while the [intermediaries] bear the costs of implementing such
updates.
Cartier Int’l AG v. British Sky Broad. Ltd. [2014] EWHC (Ch) 3354, ¶ 239
(Eng.).
224. Id. ¶ 202 (“[O]ne of the key advantages of website blocking from the
[IPROs’] perspective was that the updating machinery built into the orders
provided a mechanism for dealing with circumvention by the website opera-
tors which was not only more effective in the long run than notice-and-
takedown, but also less burdensome. In particular . . . because it enabled the
[IPROs] to use automated procedures . . . to update the orders and hence the
blocking carried out by the [intermediaries].” Id. ¶ 204.The Court accepted
“that website blocking has advantages over notice-and-takedown.” Id.
225. Comm. on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, Online Auction Sites




226. See Mann & Belzley, supra note 28, at 264; Barnett et al., supra note
131 (quoting Graeme Dinwoodie, Professor at the University of Oxford)
(“[The] EU also has appeared to consider intermediaries as the ‘lowest cost
avoiders.”).
227. See Cartier, [2014] EWHC (Ch) 3354 ¶, 204 (“The key question, to my
mind, is whether the benefits of website blocking . . . justify the costs, and in
particular the implementation costs which are imposed on the [intermediar-
ies.]”).
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respective rights that are engaged, including the rights of indi-
viduals who may be affected by the orders but who are not be-
fore the Court.”228 Further, while some may believe that impos-
ing this mandate would impair the intermediary’s freedom to
conduct business, such concern has been determined to be er-
roneous.229
With the counterfeit epidemic being such a pressing problem,
a judicial approach is not a viable solution. While the logic be-
hind the Cartier case exists within the judicial forum, if en-
forcement is kept to the judiciary and not extended to the legis-
lature, the costs may prove unworkable.230 Further, with the
current standards, “the jurisdiction where a case is filed can
dictate whether a claim for contributory infringement will be
successful,” because each jurisdiction231 has differing common
law. This is why harmonization is both appropriate and neces-
sary. Therefore, if enforcement is kept to the judiciary, it will
likely not be effective because the interpretation of the law will
vary, and maximum harmonization can only be achieved
through legislative means.232
228. Id. ¶ 261.
229. The Cartier court found this notion erroneous. Id. ¶ 195 (“As to the
[intermediary’s] freedom to carry on business, [website blocking] would not
impair the substance of this right . . . . The orders would not interfere with
the provision by the [intermediary] of their services to their customers.”).
230. Simon Baggs of Wiggin LLP, the law firm representing Cartier, stated
that the legal costs alone of seeking a court order to block counterfeit goods
are around £14,000—this figure is when intermediaries have no objection,
the figure would be higher for cases when there is an objection. See Chris
Cooke, Recent Case Provides Insight into the Costs of Web-Blocking,
COMPLETE MUSIC UPDATE (Oct. 22, 2014),
http://www.completemusicupdate.com/article/recent-case-provides-insight-
into-the-costs-of-web-blocking/.
231. Kayser et al., supra note 131; see also Katja Weckström, Liability for
Trademark Infringement for Internet Service Providers, 16 MARQ. INTELL.
PROP. L. REV. 1, 9 (2012) (“Due to the weighty and far-reaching interests at
stake, courts, at least in Europe, are not suited to decide these cases without
specific legislative guidelines . . . .”).
232. For maximum harmonization, the U.S. government may transpose the
guidelines into the United States Code—much like the DMCA for copyright
law—essentially elaborating on the Lanham Act, and the EU would create a
directive, or even more ideal, a regulation, so that compliance across each
Member State is guaranteed. But see Robert W. Payne, Unauthorized
Online Dealers of “Genuine” Products in the Amazon Marketplace and Be-
yond: Remedies for Brand Owners, 18 J. INTERNET L. 3, 9 (2014) (“[T]he
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Governments should embrace a heightened standard. In ad-
dition to shifting the burden off the IPROs, governments have
an incentive to broaden trademark protection: in the United
States, the Chamber of Commerce estimated that “for every
dollar invested in the fight against counterfeiting,” the gov-
ernment would receive $5 in additional tax revenue.233 Further,
there has already been a call for change in the United States by
a member of Congress. U.S. Senator Robert Menendez, the
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, re-
cently announced that he “wants the federal government to
crackdown” on counterfeiting through Internet channels.234
With the issue of trademark infringement on the rise, the time
to act is now, and the means are to require more from the in-
termediary by way of website and seller blocking.
CONCLUSION
Trademark protection should be a top priority for all U.S. and
EU intellectual property-related legislation. A 2001 study of
intellectual property-infringing cases across EU-Member
States revealed that “78 percent of infringements related to
trade marks, 15 percent to copyright, 6 percent to design rights
and 1 percent to patents.”235 The gross disproportion of these
statistics alone reveals that trademark infringement is the
highest targeted method of intellectual property offences. The
conundrum is that for other intellectual property infringe-
ments, intermediaries are required to remove violations. How-
ever, in the United States, intermediaries only face liability if
they know of specific instances of trademark infringement and
fail to investigate or partake in the violation. While in the EU,
failure to investigate will only eliminate automatic immunity
from liability. A rigorous government mandate that requires
website blocking is lacking yet trademark violations have never
been more rampant. While the United Kingdom with Cartier
was the first EU-Member State to require intermediaries to
block general trademark infringing material, it should not be
the last. The United States and EU should utilize the burden-
DMCA and VeRO programs are sometimes referred to as a ‘whack a mole’
game, having little real effect.”)
233. Knock-offs Catch On, supra note 185.
234. Ross, supra note 87.
235. Lambkin & Tyndall, supra note 77, at 36.
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shifting framework articulated in the Cartier decision and
transpose it into legislation to better protect trademarks and
shift some of the burden and responsibility of combatting the
counterfeit epidemic onto the intermediaries.
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